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Abstract: Apparent inconsistency in criminal sentencing at District Court level in New 
Zealand (NZ) might also be expected for health and safety in employment (HSE) offences. 
We review relevant legislation and the guidelines established in the de Spa appeal case, and 
estimate a model of HSE sentencing variability distinguishing the de Spa criteria (and a 
subset similar to those used in the formal U.S. criminal sentencing guidelines) from a more 
comprehensive list of sentencing factors routinely used. When the de Spa case-mix variables 
are controlled for, a weak increase in inter-district sentencing variability is observed but with 
a reduction in intra-district variability, while both inter and intra-judge variability is 
mitigated. We show that a number of the de Spa (and other) criteria are significant 
determinants of sentencing variation, although some results (e.g., for the presence of remorse) 
are puzzling. The results seem quite robust to the choice between a dataset including the 
common s 6 offences only and a dataset of cases as a whole as well as to several other 
sensitivity checks. We also show that the model retrospectively predicts the sentence in the de 
Spa appeal case well, and suggest how the model might be used as a basis for more consistent 
future sentencing decisions. 
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 Introduction 
 
There is considerable ongoing interest and controversy surrounding the 
consistency of judicial sentencing in New Zealand (NZ). In February 2006, the (then) 
NZ Labour Government invited the NZ Law Commission to investigate reforms to the 
sentencing and parole systems for criminal offences, leading to the publication of its 
report NZLC R94 in August 2006.
1 Evidence suggestive of sentencing inconsistency 
among Court Districts was influential in the Commission’s argument that a core 
problem was the highly discretionary nature of current sentencing and parole 
arrangements. Parliament subsequently introduced the Sentencing Council Act 2007 
with a view (inter alia) of promoting consistency in sentencing practice among 
different courts and judges. By July 2008, the Sentencing Establishment Unit (SEU) 
within the Law Commission had drafted seventeen generic guidelines and forty-two 
offence-based guidelines for criminal sentencing policy (although they have no 
official status). Following the change in government in November 2008, however, the 
Sentencing Council has not been established and formal criminal sentencing 
guidelines have not been adopted.   
 
Criminal sentencing guidelines have previously been adopted in a number of 
other countries, examples of which include the United States (U.S.), England, Canada, 
and some states of Australia. For example, the empirically-based U.S. Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines introduced in 1987 imposed much tighter limits on judicial 
discretion. Previously, sentencing had been indeterminate with broad punishment 
ranges specified. The U.S. Guidelines instead spelled out tight sentencing ranges for 
offences, largely depending on seriousness and a defendant’s criminal history. 
  
Apparent inconsistency in criminal sentencing in NZ is likely to remain 
important in public debate. Further, the issue of sentencing consistency seems to be as 
pertinent to prosecutions for offences under health and safety legislation as for 
criminal offences. New Zealand’s health and safety “guidelines” contain two distinct 
components. The first, introduced by the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 
(HSE Act) implemented on 1 April, 1993, is a specified range (with a lower bound of 
zero) of financial penalties for employers convicted of offences under the Act. 
Notably, the upper bound was increased significantly in the HSE Amendment Act 
2002, and account of new sentencing principles specified in the Sentencing Act 2002 
was also required. The second component was provided in the guideline judgment in 
the High Court (HC) case Department of Labour v de Spa and Co Ltd. [1994] 1 
ERNZ 339 involving a successful appeal against the level of sentence imposed in the 
Christchurch District Court.
2 Nine relevant sentencing factors were specified. 
Notably, the de Spa Guidelines were adopted in the Sentencing Act with only minor 
changes. 
  
In this paper, we examine empirically the NZ Courts’ sentencing criteria and 
the associated financial liability for employers convicted of offences under the HSE 
Act. We focus on Section 6 offences that are by far the most common. We also 
examine the aggregation of sentences to the case level in order to be able to 
                                                 
1 Cf. New Zealand Law Commission (2006). 
2 Cf. Department of Labour v de Spa and Co Ltd. (DC Christchurch, CRN 30090213/93, 8 October 
1993, (Holderness, J). 
  1investigate all multiple-charge and/or multiple-victim cases. To our knowledge, this is 
the first empirical study of the determinants of health and safety sentencing policy. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we outline 
the development of sentencing guidelines for offences under New Zealand’s health 
and safety legislation while in section 3, we discuss these developments in the context 
of the nascent economic theory of sentencing and of empirical assessments of the 
impact of the stringent U.S. Guidelines for criminal offences. Further, we examine 
some empirical claims of sentencing inconsistency for criminal offences in NZ. In 
section 4, we describe the construction of the database used in this study. Section 5 
discusses the analytical methods used, while section 6 presents our empirical results. 
The paper reaches conclusions and implications for sentencing policy in section 7. 
 
2  The Development of New Zealand’s Health and Safety Guidelines 
 
In the first decade of the application of the HSE Act 1992, the maximum fine 
that could be imposed was $100,000 if the offender knew the relevant act or omission 
relevant to the offence was reasonably likely to cause serious harm (s 49) or $50,000 
for other offences involving non-compliance with various provisions of the Act (s 
50).
3 Subsequently, a strong signal to the Courts to significantly increase penalties 
was provided by a fivefold increase in maximum penalties in the amendments of 2002 
which were implemented from 5 May 2003. Section 51(A) of the amended Act, 
however, also required the Courts to pay particular regard to sections 7–10 of the 
Sentencing Act 2002 (implemented from 30 June 2002) dealing  with the purposes 
and principles of sentencing, and to the requirements of s 35 and s 40.
4 
 The Sentencing Act repealed s 28 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 which had 
permitted the payment of all or part of any fine to a victim of an offence. A new 
sentence of reparation that could be awarded when a victim suffered loss or damage to 
property, emotional harm, or loss or damage consequential on any emotional or 
physical harm, or loss or damage to property, was introduced.
5 Courts were generally 
required to impose a sentence of reparation where applicable, and reparation could 
also be imposed in conjunction with other sentences. Unlike sentences for HSE Act 
offences, reparation awards are not capped.
14 If an offender can meet reparation but 
not fine payments, reparation takes precedence, while, under s 35, the Courts can 
discount losses or provide time to pay where the offender is impecunious. Further, 
                                                 
3 All financial amounts are in NZ dollars (denoted by ‘$’). On average, one NZ dollar purchased a little 
less than 60 U.S. cents during the period studied (years ending June 1994-2007) and purchased 76 U.S. 
cents at the end of this period. For comparison, the maximum s 50 penalty of $50,000 was somewhat 
higher than the median annual household income of $41,500 in year 2000. 
4 Hall (2009 at [I.1.1]) argued that maximum penalties are reserved for the most serious offences of 
their type and offer little guidance to sentencing judges, and also noted (at [I.1.4]) that the statutory 
language of the Sentencing Act “is frequently expressed in such general terms that it does not place any 
substantial fetter upon the sentencing discretion.” Hughes (2002, p. 125) noted that the new clause 
51(A) in the amended HSE Act largely repeated certain sentencing criteria in the Sentencing Act 
(including references to the ability to pay reparation) and otherwise recited the established de Spa 
Guidelines.  
5 Awards of reparation were previously possible under s 22 of the Criminal Justice Act, but were rare in 
comparison to awards of fines to victims facing more general losses than those for which reparation 
could be awarded under the Sentencing Act. 
  2under s 40, if reparation is ordered, the Court must take its magnitude into account in 
assessing the level of any fine imposed.
6 
 
In respect of de Spa, the Department of Labour successfully appealed the level 
of sentence. The defendant company was charged (inter alia) with failing to comply 
with s 6 of the HSE Act in that it failed to take all practicable steps to ensure the 
safety of its employees. The charge arose from a fatal accident when an employee was 
crushed by a moving bar while working with a wool bale elevator machine. The 
deceased went out on to a walkway to look down a shaft to check how many wool 
bales remained to be sent up an elevator, an apparently common practice. He was 
trapped by a descending bar and suffered fatal injuries. It was held that the defendant 
ought reasonably to have anticipated that an employee might decide to look down the 
shaft, especially since there was nothing in place to discourage the action. A fine of 
$6,500 was imposed on the employer. On appeal, this was considered to be manifestly 
inadequate and was raised to $15,000. This amount, however, represented only 30 
percent of the maximum fine which in turn was arguably a very small proportion of 
the loss.
7 
 
 The major argument advanced by the appellant in favour of a significantly 
increased fine was the increase in maximum penalties included in the HSE Act.   
Generally, the maximum penalty had increased ten-fold and the District Court (DC) 
judge had selected a starting point of $10,000 for sentencing whereas a figure some 
three times as large was seen by the appellant to have been more appropriate. The HC 
judges were not especially impressed with such quantitative comparisons and 
considered starting points to be potentially misleading in the context. In their view, 
the sole merit of a starting point in health and safety sentencing was to indicate the 
magnitude of any discount for a plea of guilty.
8  Further,  while t he proportionate 
                                                 
6 Gordon and Woodfield (2006) argued that the HSE Act amendments appeared to be tempered by the 
application of the Sentencing Act. The Courts appeared initially reluctant to increase total financial 
liabilities much at all, and fines were substantially substituted by reparation awards (see also Mason 
(2008)). Although more recent evidence suggested that liability levels were increasing markedly, they 
remained well below the levels signaled by legislation. The HC decision in Department of Labour v 
Street Smart Ltd (2008) 5 NZELR 587 (BC200862161), however, substantially increased the fine on 
the basis that insurance was carried against an award of reparation so that the capacity to pay a higher 
fine was not impeded by such an award. Notably, insurability of fines was outlawed under the 
Sentencing Act, while insurance against reparation awards continued to be legal. Further, in 
Department of Labour v Hanham & Philp Contractors Ltd, Cookie Time Ltd, and Black Reef Mine Ltd 
(HC Christchurch, CRI 2008-409-000002/000034/00009, 17 December 2008, Randerson J, Chief High 
Court Judge, Pankhurst J), financial liabilities in the form of both fines and reparations were increased 
very significantly; fines by a factor in Hanham and Philp Contractors, fines by more than 150 percent 
in Cookie Time, and both fines and reparations by 100 percent in Black Reef Mine, while substantial 
sentencing starting points (depending on employer culpability) were also established.  
7 While it is impossible to compensate a fatally injured worker in the sense of making this person 
indifferent to the accident, it is possible to make an employer liable for a value of a “statistical” life.  
Adapting some international willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept measures of mortality risk to 
New Zealand, Access Economics (2006) reported a “conservative” estimate for the value of a statistical 
life of $3.9 million for 2003 (the mean estimate being $6.9 m.), representing an estimated value per life 
year of $184,216 using a discount rate of 3.8 percent and a 40 year (remaining) life expectancy.  In de 
Spa, the victim was only 18 years old. 
8 Although starting points in HSE sentencing were not mandatory during the period examined in the 
present article, after some initial confusion, where they were used they were chosen to reflect the 
culpability of the offending prior to addressing any mitigating or aggravating circumstances of the 
particular offender. Note also that the draft NZ criminal sentencing guidelines proposed a first step 
  3increase in maximum fines was “of relevance”, the magnitude of the change was not 
seen as a critical issue. Thus, “we do not think too much should be made of the 
proportionate increase in maximum fines, whether it be ten times or five times.” The 
signal sent by the legislature reflected “first changes in the value of money and second 
a view by Parliament that broad levels of penalty being imposed by the Courts are not 
adequate”.
9 As the HC judges recognized, however, the DC judge had been 
influenced by several (unspecified) earlier penalty decisions. And while deterrence 
was a relevant question, it was only one among a number of variables determining 
appropriate fine levels. 
 
The HC judges then turned their attention to criteria deemed to be relevant in 
sentencing. They were stated not to be intended to be exhaustive although the final 
criterion is a residual for any remaining case-specific relevant factors. The de Spa 
Guidelines are summarised in the holding and are listed below:  
 
1.  The degree of culpability;  
2.  The degree of harm resulting;  
3.   The financial circumstances of the offender;  
4.  The attitude of the offender, including remorse, co-operation, and taking 
remedial action;  
5.  Any guilty plea; 
6.  The need for deterrence;  
7.  Compensation to the victim under s 28 Criminal Justice Act 1985; 
8.  The employer’s safety record; 
9.  The facts of the particular case. 
 
Hall (2009 at [I.2.2(c)]) argued that little attempt is made in NZ guideline judgments 
to analyse, categorise and weigh the factors influencing sentence, with what is seen to 
be relevant sentencing factors merely being identified. In this respect, de Spa is 
typical. No indication of whether these factors are listed in any particular order of 
importance is given, nor whether different weights should be applied to the different 
criteria.
10 Not even the signs of the effects of various criteria on penalties are 
provided, although these may be implicit in general NZ sentencing principles.
11  
                                                                                                                                            
categorizing a given offence in terms of an appropriate band of seriousness and the selection of a 
suitable starting point for the sentence.    
9 Parliament could easily deal with changes in the value of money by indexing fines for inflation. 
10 The criteria are elaborated upon to different degrees in the HC judgment. For example, in respect of 
criterion 1, a careful appraisal of the circumstances of the breach would be needed for the assessment 
of employer culpability, while for criterion 3, it was argued that a given fine will impinge differently 
upon a small impecunious employer as opposed to a large financially strong employer. For criterion 6, 
both specific and general deterrence are required to be addressed, with weighting dependant on the 
circumstances. Regarding criterion 7, the reference to the level of fine to impose in the preamble to the 
factors to be included may have created some difficulties of interpretation. Our reading suggested that 
the HC judges considered that the level of fine should be set prior to deciding if, and how much, of the 
fine would be awarded to the victim, but some judges apparently wrongly considered that the level of 
fine could be determined in part by a prior decision whether to award the fine, in whole or part, to the 
victim. See the discussion in Debro Transport v Department of Labour [1995] ELB 121 and Fairfax 
Industries v Department of Labour, unreported, HC Auckland, 15 October 1996, AP 177/96.   
11 According to Hall (2009 at [I.4.3]), judges need to preserve “a reasonable degree of uniformity of 
penalty between offenders convicted of the same offence at or about the same level of culpability.” 
Sentences are meant to reflect the gravity of an offence, in part signalled by the size of the maximum 
penalty but also reflecting acts of commission and omission relevant to the facts of the particular case. 
  4 
The HC judges applied their sentencing criteria to the facts in de Spa. They 
considered the employer to have exhibited a medium level of culpability in that the 
hazard was readily foreseeable. The ultimate (i.e., fatal) level of harm resulted. The 
employer was not impecunious, and their attitude was favourable, with prompt 
remedial action and establishment of a safety committee. No guilty plea was entered, 
so no consideration was necessary on this account or on the issue of victim 
compensation. The defence of a complete absence of fault had not been established at 
DC level, and the defendant did not appeal the decision. Although particular 
deterrence was not seen to be required, the sentence needed to provide general 
deterrence. A good safety record without incident or complaint was evident over a 17 
year period. On balance, the HC judges considered a sentence representing only 13 
percent of the statutory maximum to be manifestly inadequate given that the 
maximum penalty was to cover the worst possible case, and they could not imagine 
such a case to be eight times worse than de Spa. The fine was therefore increased by 
130 percent to $15,000. Why this (rather than some other specific amount) was seen 
to be appropriate was not discussed, but it was noted that an initial fine of as much as 
$20,000 would have been unlikely to be overturned on appeal. 
 
 The  de Spa Guidelines and the accompanying reasoning provided in the 
judgment became a major reference point for subsequent sentencing decisions, and 
were later incorporated in the HSE Amendment Act without significant change.    
 
3  New Zealand’s Health and Safety Guidelines in Context 
 
  In this section, we first discuss some recent developments in the economic 
theory of sentencing and then briefly review empirical evaluations of aspects of the 
U.S. Guidelines for criminal offences. We consider the properties of NZ’s health and 
safety “guidelines” in the context of these discussions. Finally, we also examine some 
empirical claims of sentencing inconsistency for criminal offences in NZ. 
 
3.1  Economic Theory of Sentencing 
 
  Shavell (2007) and Miceli (2008) examine whether and when it is in society’s 
interest to permit judicial discretion given that judicial objectives may differ from 
those of society as a whole. They use a representative judge model to make their 
major points, and do not directly address the issue of inter-judge variability. Their 
analyses allow sentencing rules or guidelines to depend only on included (publicly 
observable) variables, so that granting discretion to judges allows them to make 
decisions that reflect the remaining unincluded variables that are unobservable except 
to judges at the time of a trial. Discretion is then desirable if decisions should depend 
on unobservable relevant information that is only available ex post the rule setting. 
Discretion, however, can be harmful if judges use their acquired information to set 
                                                                                                                                            
First offences constitute mitigation, while previous convictions may be treated as indicators of 
character relevant for sentencing since they may signal future offender behaviour. Contrition, 
repentance, or remorse receive a discount in mitigation if considered to be genuine. Guilty pleas 
typically mitigate culpability and usually merit a discounted sentence. The size of this discount is at the 
judge’s discretion but conventionally falls in the range 10-33 percent and more commonly in the range 
20-25 percent. 
  5sentences that reflect their own objectives rather than those of society, say by setting a 
fine much lower or higher than would society as a whole. 
 
Judicial guidelines directly seek to restrict the scope of discretion. 
Considerable room for discretionary deviation may remain, however, and this may be 
beneficial since both Shavell and Miceli (among others) show that a positive scope for 
discretion is desirable under quite general conditions. Shavell (2007) emphasizes the 
need for judges to resemble society somewhat if they are to be accorded discretion, 
and the optimal scope of discretion must be contained in the first-best range of 
decisions as it is pointless to permit decisions that could never be socially optimal. If a 
judge might make a decision outside the first-best range, the optimal scope for 
discretion must lie strictly within it. Overall, scope restriction is considered a rough 
control device by Shavell since it has no effect on deviation within the allowed scope 
but precludes further discretion when further discretion is warranted. 
 
Evidently, New Zealand exhibits considerable scope for judicial discretion in 
respect of HSE offences. The lower bound of the permissible fine is zero which 
allows for convictions without any financial liability in particular circumstances. 
These, however, are rare in our database; for example, they amount to only 1.4 
percent of cases that include a s 6 offence through mid-2007. Absent reparation, the 
zero lower bound may send a signal to judges that a minor penalty will suffice. This 
was especially likely where the maximum fine was initially set at the relatively low 
level of $50,000 for a single-charge breach of s 50 of the HSE Act. The 2002 
amendments to the Act maintained the lower bound at zero and raised the maximum 
fine to $250,000.
12 Notably, this maximum has never been reached, and neither was 
its predecessor, in each case leaving a substantial margin for the “worst possible 
case”. And while total financial liabilities have gradually increased, in some cases 
substantially so, there may be circumstances where a fine well in excess of zero is 
warranted (although a small penalty is imposed) and (different) circumstances where 
a fine well in excess of $250,000 would be warranted (although a penalty well less 
than $250,000 is imposed to leave room for the elusive “worst possible case”).   
 
  In Miceli’s (2008) model, if the primary goal of punishment is deterrence, the 
(familiar) optimal risk-neutral sanction equals the harm imposed times the inverse of 
the probability of apprehension. This “deterrence ideal” is independent of the 
characteristics of the offender, implying that a sentencing range is otiose. In the de 
Spa Guidelines, both the degree of harm and the degree of employer culpability are 
identified characteristics of offences to be considered at sentencing but there is no 
clear link to be followed between the characteristics and the sentence. In any case, it 
is difficult to credit that the current maximum penalty in NZ even begins to approach 
the harm arising from fatal or other very serious accidents in typical cases. Miceli 
(1991) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000), however, recognize that other values such as 
fairness may have a role in penalty-setting, requiring the characteristics of the 
offender as well as the crime to be taken into account in sentencing. When the 
legislature cares about fairness and deterrence, the optimal sentence lies between the 
fair sentence and the deterrence ideal. Judicial decisions, however, are identified 
solely with fairness in Miceli’s 2008 model. Given sentencing guidelines, judicial 
                                                 
12 Notably, the real value of the maximum penalty would have been maintained by an increase of 
$10,000 rather than the actual increase of $200,000. 
  6discretion is constrained by lower and upper bounds on the sanction which are 
required given that a legislature would find it too costly to anticipate and provide for 
all possible realizations of offender characteristics and could not condition the 
sanction on characteristics that are unobservable to them in any case. In the de Spa 
Guidelines, characteristics relevant to sentencing convicted offenders include their 
ability to make payment, remorse, co-operation, remedial action, guilty plea, need for 
deterrence (including particular deterrence), and safety record. Most (if not all) of 
these characteristics only become known at the time of trial. Once known, guidelines 
could specify penalties that were functionally related to measures of these 
characteristics. The de Spa Guidelines, however, make no such attempt allowing 
judges considerable room to deviate from what society would consider appropriate 
penalties, and also considerable room for inter-judicial variation in sentencing. 
  
Miceli’s results include the following: First, optimal sentencing guidelines 
afford judges some discretion in order to promote fairness, but the role of deterrence 
limits their discretion to a range that includes the deterrence ideal.
13 It is hard to credit 
that the NZ legislative guidelines include this ideal except in cases of less than serious 
injuries involving relatively brief rehabilitation periods. Second, as the weight given 
to deterrence increases, the sentencing constraints tighten on both sides of the ideal, 
so that formerly relatively soft and relatively harsh sentences are no longer permitted.  
Yet when NZ legislation increased the maximum penalty five-fold, the cap was still 
far below the deterrence ideal for serious harms while the minimum penalty remained 
at zero. Soft sentencing could continue while harsh sentencing effectively remained 
difficult if not impossible for serious harm injuries. Third, offences that are more 
harmful socially increase the deterrence ideal so both bounds on sanctions must move 
to accommodate this. In NZ, for serious harms, the amended maximum penalty is now 
closer to this ideal, but still remains well below it. The lower bound was not adjusted.   
 
  If sentencing guidelines are rejected, an alternative approach is to permit the 
judge a decision-based payoff whereby judges setting penalties outside a specified 
interval would be penalized sufficiently to deter them from so doing. In NZ, however, 
District Court judges are paid uniform salaries so that their compensation is not 
decision-based. Another approach considered by Shavell is the appeals process. 
Suppose that an appeal court observes ex post an unincluded variable and if the 
judge’s decision differs from the socially best decision evaluated at the observed 
value, the decision is changed to reflect the socially best decision and a reversal 
sanction is imposed on the trial judge. At trial, the parties observe the unincluded 
variable and the trial judge can then determine when appeals would be made, and will 
not make a decision that would result in an appeal and hence pays no sanction in 
equilibrium since appeals do not occur and their costs are saved. In NZ, HSE offence 
                                                 
13 There is an alternative perspective that argues in favour of discretion to promote deterrence. One 
reason is that if offenders are risk-averse, greater sentencing variation with a fixed expected 
punishment will enhance deterrence. Miceli (2008) has reservations about this argument since risk-
attitudes of offenders are not directly observable. Attitudes to risk, however, might be inferred from 
offenders’ purchases of insurance in unrelated markets. Another argument is that discretion permits a 
form of price discrimination, allowing judges to impose harsher sentences on those more difficult to 
deter. The expected punishment could have included a weight reflecting the marginal cost of the 
sanction to an offender, and low marginal cost offenders would require a larger dose of sanction to 
compensate. Yet in practice, only criminal history seems to intrude given that repeat offenders appear 
harder to deter. 
 
  7appeals are relatively rare. In the database used in the present study, fewer than 1 
percent of DC cases involving an injury were subsequently appealed. This is 
suggestive of the presence of meaningful constraints on judicial sentencing 
variability. In addition, although flexibility in sentencing is a precursor to sentencing 
variability, it is not a sufficient condition. Although the de Spa Guidelines are thin on 
sentencing detail, the reasoning adopted in de Spa is explicitly followed by the 
judiciary in the vast majority of cases. Further, it is common for sentences to be 
benchmarked by judges to those imposed in other, similar cases and thereby 
encouraging reduced sentencing variability. And even though little sentencing 
guidance is available within prescribed ranges, the HSE Act does provide precise 
ranges for sentencing. 
 
3.2  The United States Criminal Sentencing Guidelines    
 
Following efforts by various U.S. states in earlier years, the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act 1984 created the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which introduced 
empirically-based Federal Sentencing Guidelines that imposed tight limits on judicial 
discretion. Determinate (mandatory) sentencing was introduced, many offender 
characteristics were given little if any weight, and judges faced a fairly strict menu of 
punishment levels for offences involving conviction. Judges were typically bound to 
set sentences within an appropriate range and ranges were set sufficiently tightly so 
that judicial discretion should have been significantly attenuated.
14    The objectives of 
the U.S. Guidelines were to promote deterrence, incapacitate dangerous offenders, 
impose just punishments, and rehabilitate convicted offenders. 
 
It is evident that the de Spa Guidelines stand in stark contrast to the above. In 
essence, the de Spa Guidelines merely provide a list of factors which DC judges 
should consider when sentencing employers convicted for HSE Act offences. In 
contrast, the U.S. Guidelines provide judges with limited discretion in ranges of 
sentences which are computed in a mechanical fashion and which give most weight to 
a single characteristic for both offences (seriousness) and offenders (criminal history). 
The de Spa Guidelines do make reference to the extent of harm suffered by victims of 
workplace accidents and to the employer’s safety record but no schedule of penalty 
ranges was specified. Similarly, no schedule of penalty ranges was specified for any 
of the remaining seven criteria. As a result, while the de Spa Guidelines appear more 
comprehensive in terms of offence and offender characteristics, judicial discretion 
seems much more proscribed in the narrowly focused, more stringent U.S. 
Guidelines.
15  
                                                 
14 In United States v. Fanfan and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that guidelines were truly just guidelines, i.e., had advisory status only and were 
not mandatory. Some subsequent empirical puzzles involving the effects of the guidelines may have 
arisen due to this distinction.  
15 The empirical analysis of the U.S. Guidelines focused on whether or not they achieved a goal of 
reducing undesirable sentencing disparity among individual judges. The results are mixed, in part 
because of important conceptual differences among the studies. Sentencing proportionality and 
disproportionality are frequently distinguished. Proportionality involves sentencing variation that is 
justified by relevant differences among offenders and their offences. Disproportionality reflects 
sentencing variation that is not attributable to relevant sentencing factors, and is usually seen to 
constitute “unwarranted” disparity. Several studies, including Waldfogel (1991, 1992), Payne (1997), 
LaCasse and Payne (1999), reported increases rather than reductions in unwarranted disparity in a 
number of instances. Waldfogel (1998) also found that a reduction in disproportionality was 
  8 
3.3  Criminal Sentencing Variability in New Zealand 
 
Unlike the empirical analyses of the U.S. Guidelines, empirical analyses of 
criminal sentencing in NZ focus on the variation in average sentences imposed by 
District Court judges across the different court districts. For example, the appendix to 
NZLC R94 is a synopsis of a commissioned report by Taylor Duignan Barry Ltd. 
(2006) which investigated the degree of variation in prison sentencing across 
seventeen NZ District Court regions for a variety of offences. They analysed 65 
different offence types and 12 different offence sub-categories for 2004-05 in terms of 
the percentage of offenders sent to prison for a given offence type, and, conditional on 
being imprisoned, the nominal term of imprisonment. While considerable variation in 
sentencing seems apparent in their data, little statistical analysis of such variation is 
reported.
16 Further, there are no controls for offence or offender characteristics, and 
sentencing variation across individual judges is not addressed. NZLC R94, however, 
accepts these results as demonstrating “substantial variations in practice” which “are 
unlikely to be explicable on the basis of differences in offence or offender variables. 
Instead, they clearly indicate that some courts are systematically more severe than 
others, at least in relation to the percentage of convicted offenders who are 
imprisoned” (p. 20).  
  
The NZ Law Commission’s Sentencing Establishment Unit (SEU) (2008) 
addressed the issue of the extent to which DC variations in criminal sentencing 
reflected judicial preference rather than differences in the characteristics of offences 
or offenders.
17 They referred to two papers (SEU (2007a), SEU (2007b)) dealing with 
DC variation in the use of imprisonment which concluded that substantial variation 
existed over the period 2004-06.
18 SEU (2007a) did not control for variation in the 
nature of offending or offenders and found that the highest imprisonment rate (Napier, 
20.4%), was over 50 percent greater than that for all DCs (13.3%), and more than 
double the lowest rate (Wellington, 9.0%). SEU (2007b) controlled for the variation 
in the composition of offending by creating 157 groups of offenders sentenced with 
some resulting reduction in variation across regions but the adjusted Napier 
imprisonment rate remained over twice that of Wellington.     
 
SEU (2008) instead focused on drink driving and burglary sentencing since for 
these two offences, data exists on some characteristics of offending and offenders. For 
drink driving, SEU (2008, p. 4) obtained “comprehensive data on a range of factors 
                                                                                                                                            
outweighed by an even larger loss in proportionality. Anderson, King, and Stith (1999), however, 
considered only the variation that arises from the identity of the sentencing judge, and showed that 
disparity in this sense decreased during the post-reform period.  
16 This report, entitled Variations in District Court Sentencing: Regional Analysis. 2006 (4 June) was 
published as Miscellaneous Paper NZLC MP0 by the Law Commission on 15 August 2006 with the 
title  Regional analysis of variations in District Court sentencing, available at 
www.lawcom.govt.nz/ProjectMiscellaneousPaper.aspx?ProjectID=126 (Accessed November 5, 2009). 
The report is identified as a draft at this site, and on p. 9 claims to provide spreadsheets that include the 
mean, standard deviation and range of nominal prison sentences for each region for each category of 
offence. We were unable to locate this material in the report and sought clarification from the authors. 
Although the material was apparently supplied to the Law Commission, it did not form part of NZLC 
MP0 and there are no records of a final version having been produced.   
17 Sentencing Establishment Unit (2008). 
18 Cf. Sentencing Establishment Unit (2007a), Sentencing Establishment Unit (2007b).  
  9that are significant determinants of seriousness...” More limited data was also 
available for burglary offences.
19   
 
  Unadjusted imprisonment rates for drink driving over 2004-06 were broadly 
similar to sentencing in general but the variation between highest and lowest (Napier 
v Auckland) was much greater (13.4% v 2.0%). The available characteristics of 
offending and offenders were then examined. Differences in recidivism rates 
explained 24 percent of the difference between Napier and Auckland, and an 
offender’s prior record of drink driving offending was adopted as the key factor in the 
SEU’s draft sentencing guideline for this offence. Little additional variation was 
reduced by considering the joint effects of recidivism and alcohol levels, and 
including a number of other factors closely related to these two variables. It was 
concluded that about 27 percent of the variation in drink driving imprisonment rates 
between Napier and Auckland was due to differences in offenders and their offending, 
leaving 73 percent of the difference to “local sentencing policy”.
20 
  
      Burglary exhibited a similar pattern to drink driving but showed less 
unadjusted regional sentencing variation. Regional differences were examined in a 
related manner to that of drink driving (although important data gaps were 
recognized), and the authors tentatively concluded that around 10-15 percent of 
regional variation in imprisonment rates may be attributable to regional variation in 
criminal history and the scale of offending/value of stolen property or losses incurred.   
 
  SEU recognized that their conclusions that differences in regional sentencing 
policies constitute the major determinant of regional imprisonment rate variations do 
not necessarily carry over to the vast number of remaining offences. Nevertheless, 
they argued (p. 21) that “..., a strong inference that it is likely can be drawn. There is 
no reason to think that drink driving and burglary are special cases.” We return to 
these conclusions when discussing our empirical results for HSE offences in the 
following sections.  
 
  
4  HSE Offence Data 
 
  Our main dataset consists of charge-level information coded from several 
sources. The major source was provided to us in an electronic form by the NZ 
Department of Labour and contained a largely comprehensive list of successful 
prosecutions for HSE offences since inception of the HSE Act through mid-2007 
sentencing dates.
21 This database included case names, citations, defendant names, 
description of any injuries, accident descriptions, offence and decision dates, and 
amounts of any fines imposed and reparations awarded, along with case decisions and 
sentencing notes where readily available. The Department of Labour also provided a 
file identifying cases by judge in electronic form
22 and was also particularly helpful in 
tracking down and supplying both electronic and hard copies of decisions, sentencing 
                                                 
19 Unlike Taylor et al. (2006), the SEU (2007a, 2007b, 2008) studies did not examine imprisonment 
terms and, like Taylor et al. (2006), they did not examine inter-judge sentencing variability. 
20 This makes the very strong implicit assumption that residual sentencing variation can be identified 
only with “local sentencing policy.” 
21 Department of Labour, HSE.xls (unpublished), Wellington. 
22 Department of Labour, Cases by Judge.xls (unpublished), Wellington.. 
  10notes, and returns on prosecutions that were otherwise unavailable to us. Their 
summaries of facts were also quite useful in breaking down the elements of each 
charge. In addition, the Safeguard CourtBase provided succinct summaries of each 
accident and returns on prosecutions for post-2002 cases (however, only since 2004/5 
did the returns on prosecutions begin to include information on the sentencing 
factors). Returns on prosecutions were very useful where no decision/sentencing note 
was available for a particular case.
23  
 
We focus on the period from March 1994 to June 2007. March 1994 was 
selected as the starting point so that all cases examined could be directly influenced 
by the availability of the de Spa Guidelines (produced in the High Court de Spa 
decision on March 24, 1994). We end our study period in June 2007 to ensure that 
data available to us is as comprehensive as possible and to allow sufficient time for a 
potential appeal of the District Court judgements included in our dataset.
24 
 
As indicated in section 1, our main empirical objective is to examine the 
effects of various sentencing criteria on the liability for employers convicted of 
offences under the HSE Act. We measure an employer’s financial liability by the sum 
of all fines imposed and reparations awarded in each charge/case.
25 If fines and 
reparations are treated as very close substitutes by employers, their sum is a good 
measure of financial liability for a particular breach of a statutory duty and, hence, the 
incentive to comply with the provisions of the HSE Act. Further, until recently (and 
including the data period of our study), the courts appeared to treat fines and 
reparations as close substitutes when sentencing under the Sentencing Act in 
accordance with the “two-step” approach set out in Department of Labour v Ferrier 
Woolscours (Canterbury Ltd) [2005] DCR 356 in conjunction with the “totality 
principle” requiring the overall severity of a sentence to be proportionate to the level 
of offending. We do not include court costs in our measure of total financial liability 
for two reasons. First, although we have comprehensive data on fines and reparations, 
there are many cases with missing information on cost awards. Secondly, there is no 
indication in the de Spa Guidelines that court costs should in a systematic manner 
depend on the characteristics of the case or the defendant. Therefore, court costs 
should only appear as a constant term in our models – independent of the level of the 
explanatory variables we use (and describe below). Our approach was further 
supported by one of our sensitivity checks (results available on request) where the 
inclusion of court costs in the total financial liability did not qualitatively affect any of 
our findings. 
 
                                                 
23 Other legal online databases (Brookers, LexisNexisNZ, and Linxplus) had few additional HSE 
judicial decisions (and even fewer sentencing notes) available. 
24 At this stage, we do not analyse High Court decisions per se but in future work, we want to be able 
to investigate how much of the “initial” sentencing variation at the District Court level “withstands the 
threat” of a High Court appeal. 
25 We refer to ‘financial liability’ rather than ‘financial penalty’ since it is arguable whether reparation 
should be considered to be a penalty. Mason (2008) argued that reparation is restorative and attempts to 
right a wrong, and as such is not punitive in nature. Hall (2009) is less emphatic, but also raised doubt 
(at I.3.5) as to whether “true” reparation should be classified as punishment rather than constituting the 
equivalent of civil damages. Clark (2008), however, noted that the compensatory purpose of reparation 
does not imply that reparation awards have no punitive or deterrent effect. Whatever the intent of a 
sentence, our focus is on the bottom line and as such effectively treats ‘financial liability’ as a financial 
penalty. 
  11With respect to sentencing criteria, the data we code contains detailed 
information on the characteristics of each charge/case (such as the degrees of harm 
and culpability, employee breach of duty, and the presence of remedial action) and the 
defendant (such as the employer’s safety record, need for particular deterrence, and 
financial limitations and size).
26 Using this information (where available), we create 
proxies for the case characteristics specified in the de Spa Guidelines. For each 
characteristic, we create categories which resemble the categories most often used in 
the case decisions and/or sentencing notes. In particular, we code the de Spa factors as 
follows: 
 
1.  The degree of culpability: we assign each charge/case into one of the 
following six culpability categories: ‘low’, ‘low-medium’, ‘medium’, ‘medium-high’, 
‘high’, and ‘unknown’;  
  
2.  The degree of harm resulting: we use four mutually-exclusive categories of 
harm: ‘low or medium’, ‘high’, ‘fatal’, and ‘unknown’;  
 
3.   The financial circumstances of the offender: we use a binary variable (0/1) to 
indicate the presence of a defendant’s financial limitations; 
  
4.  The attitude of the offender, including remorse, co-operation, and taking 
remedial action: the presence of remorse, cooperation, and remedial action is 
indicated by three separate binary variables (0/1) – one for each of the expressions of 
the offender’s attitude; 
  
5.  Any guilty plea: indicated by a binary variable (0/1); 
 
6.  The need for deterrence: the need for deterrence is expressed by two binary 
variables (0/1) indicating separately the ‘need for particular deterrence’ and the ‘need 
for general deterrence’; 
  
7.  Compensation to the victim under s 28 Criminal Justice Act 1985: as noted 
earlier, this criterion may have created some difficulties of interpretation. Our reading 
suggested that the HC judges considered that the level of fine should be set prior to 
deciding if, and how much, of the fine would be awarded to the victim. Therefore, we 
do not include compensation to the victim as an explanatory variable in our models of 
the financial liability imposed; 
  
8.  The employer’s safety record: we use six categories of the defendant’s safety 
record: ‘poor’, ‘previous convictions’, ‘no previous convictions’, ‘good’, ‘great’, and 
‘unknown’; 
 
9.  The facts of the particular case: in some of our models described below, we 
include additional characteristics of each case. Namely, we create separate binary 
variables (0/1) for the presence of a voluntary payment, employer attendance at a 
restorative justice conference, and an employee breach of duty.
27 We also express the 
                                                 
26 Unfortunately, the quality of information available to us varies and we know relatively little about 
some of our early charges/cases.  
27 It is surprising that employee breach was not included in the de Spa list and it is evident that it took 
some time before employee culpability had much impact on employee penalties. The courts 
  12size of the employer as: ‘small’, ‘medium’, ‘large’, or ‘unknown’.
28 Finally, we 
indicate in which year the offence took place in order to account for a national trend 
in HSE sentencing including any structural shifts in sentencing after the 
implementation of the Sentencing Act 2002, the introduction of the HSE Act 
amendments, and the end of the “honeymoon period”.
29 
 
  To obtain a proxy for the need of general deterrence (in addition to the judge’s 
explicit recognition of such need), we merged our charge-level data with industry-
level accident and employment data obtained from two separate sources. Our accident 
data comes from the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) Injury Statistics and 
consists of annual numbers of new claims for work-related injuries in June-years 
1993-2007. Data for 1993 has never been produced and so we use 1992 data instead. 
In 1992, claims were aggregated by industry at the 3-digit New Zealand Standard 
Industry Classification (NZSIC) level and starting in 1994, they were aggregated at 
the 2-digit Australian and New Zealand Standard Industry Classification (ANZSIC) 
level. While the two classifications are similar, they are not identical and so we 
needed to create our own industry classification which encompasses both of the 
standard classifications and is consistent over time. 
 
  In order to calculate ACC accident rates, we divided the number of new ACC 
claims by total employment (of individuals age 15 and above) from the Household 
Labour Force Statistics (HLFS). HLFS switched to ANZSIC industry classification in 
1997 and so we had to make similar adjustment as with the accident data above.   
 
  ACC accident rates were merged to our charge-level data by industry and the 
decision year and, on average, half-year lags were used (i.e., all cases with decisions 
in a given calendar year were assigned accident rates for the corresponding June-year; 
so, for example, all decisions in year 1995 were assigned accident rates for the period 
July 1994-June 1995). Lagging the accident rates and using industry-level aggregates 
helps mitigate the possible problem of reverse causality where accident rates are 
themselves determined by the level of financial liabilities (or a particular financial 
liability in our case). Importantly, an industry code for the activity during which the 
accident in question occurred (rather than the employer’s main industry classification) 
was used is assigning industry-level accident rates. So, for example, when an 
employee in a University cafe was injured in processing food,
30 the accident was not 
assigned to education services but to food production and when an employee of a 
                                                                                                                                            
specifically referred to a hierarchy that focused primarily on employer culpability; see Moore v 
Department of Labour, unreported, HC Christchurch, 5 July 2001, A 50/01. Nevertheless, sentences 
could be lowered for employers (employee culpability being a mitigating factor) even in the early 
years.  
28 As expected, smaller employers are more likely to be subject to financial limitations but the 
correlation is far from perfect. While none of the employers identified as ‘large’ are recorded as having 
financial limitations, 33% of ‘small’ employers and 67% of ‘medium’ employers have financial 
limitations recorded. Data on employer size, however, is limited. 
29 See the relevant judicial comments by Judge Everitt in Department of Labour v Asian New Zealand 
Meat Company Limited and Command Pacific (NZ) Ltd, unreported, DC Dunedin, 28 April 1995, CRN 
4/14001 and 4/14002-4/mm, and Judge Robertson in Hirepool Auckland Ltd v Department of Labour, 
unreported, HC Auckland, 4 February 1997AP 301/96. 
30 Department of Labour v University of Otago, DC Dunedin, 24 November 2003, CRN 3012510001 
(O’Driscoll, J). 
  13funeral director was injured while manufacturing coffins,
31 the accident was not 
assigned to funeral services but to wood products.
32 This approach assumes that 
general deterrence applies to mitigating hazards related to specific high-risk activities, 
rather than in selected groups of firms. This assumption is consistent with prevalence 
as a general sentencing factor (Hall (2009 at I.5.4)) and with the Department of 
Labour’s Occupational Safety and Health Service (OSH) priority areas.
33 
 
  In one of our sensitivity analyses (results available on request), we further 
tested for the importance of general deterrence by adding a lag of the industry-level 
annual number of successful prosecutions calculated from our main dataset. This was 
done to acknowledge that judges may be more sensitive to cases that reach the 
prosecution stage than simply to employment accidents. A drawback is that no lag 
could be constructed for the first year of data, 1994, and so we had to exclude 1994 
cases from these estimations. Overall, all of our results proved robust to the addition 
of the number of successful prosecutions and the new variable itself was statistically 
insignificant. 
 
  Finally, we want to take into account the potential effects of price level 
changes on the nominal level of financial penalties imposed. To do that, we merged 
our charge-level dataset with Consumer Price Index data provided by Statistics New 
Zealand. We tried linear as well as logarithmic specifications. In a linear model, 
changes in the price level are allowed to affect the level of liabilities. In a logarithmic 
model, inflation is allowed to have a percentage effect on liabilities. The results were 
very similar across these different specifications and so, for an ease of interpretation 
(especially with interacted explanatory variables), we only report CPI coefficients in 
the tables below. 
 
   Our master dataset includes 2,064 charges. Out of those, we primarily focus 
on s 6 offences that are by far the most common (representing 47% of all charges in 
our dataset). Section 6 of the HSE Act states that “Every employer shall take all 
practicable steps to ensure the safety of employees while at work” and section 2A of 
the HSE Amendment Act qualifies “all practicable steps” as “all reasonably 
practicable steps”. As such, a s 6 offence is a very general offence (unlike most 
criminal offences in New Zealand). We focus on s 6 offences (including the 1% of 
such offences involving any subsection of s 6) in order to limit ourselves to a coherent 
set of charges for which similar sentencing criteria (and hence a similar application of 
the de Spa Guidelines) might be expected. In order to achieve further coherence, we 
only examine charges for an injury (as opposed to an incident), limit ourselves to 
District Court (as opposed to High Court) cases, and study convictions without a 
discharge. Limiting ourselves to District Court cases has the added advantage of 
investigating sentencing practice (and variation) as it “initially occurs” (as opposed to 
practice which “withstands the threat” of a High Court appeal). For all of our charges, 
we identify which District Court and judge handled the case. With respect to 
discharges, we have decided not to estimate a two-stage Heckman model (estimating 
first the probability of discharge and only then the magnitude of the financial liability 
                                                 
31 Department of Labour v Westland Funeral Services Ltd., DC Greymouth, 14 October 1993, CRN 
3018004685 (Costigan, J). 
32 While such classification is partly subject to our discretion, most accidents seem uncontroversial in 
their assignment to an industry. 
33 http://www.osh.dol.govt.nz/ (Accessed April 21, 2009). 
  14conditional on no discharge) for two reasons: First, only 12 of the charges satisfying 
our other sample inclusion criteria involved a discharge and it would be very difficult 
to estimate the probability of discharge with such a small sample. Second, the de Spa 
criteria only relate to sentencing. As such, these guidelines come into play after (and 
separate from) a decision regarding conviction. The above restrictions leave us with 
775 charge-level observations for which a s 6 charge was either the sole charge or 
listed in a multi-charge case with a sentence explicitly imposed on the s 6 component. 
In each of our model specifications (described in section 5 below), we use all 
observations for which all of the variables of interest (dependent and explanatory) can 
be constructed.
34 
 
  To check how our model performs in multiple-charge and/or multiple-victim 
cases (including those without a s 6 offence), we also examine the aggregation of 
sentences to the case level. This analysis can address the concern that sentencing 
variability regarding s 6 charges arises in part because judges may attach the whole 
sentence to a single (often s 6) charge. Our inclusion criteria in the case-level analysis 
are similar to the charge-level analysis. Namely, we investigate cases which involved 
at least one injury, were handled by a District Court, and involved convictions without 
discharge (for each case, we aggregate all charges on which the defendant was 
convicted). The resulting case-level sample contains 1,100 observations and all 
observations for which the necessary variables can be constructed are used in each 
model specification.
35 
 
  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our Section 6 and case-level samples. 
As expected, the mean total financial liability is higher for cases than for their s 6 
components ($11,765 compared to $10,835). The difference is not large but that is 
consistent with the fact that the mean number of charges per case in our case-level 
dataset is “only” 1.32.
36 Overall, the case-level sample seems to include slightly less 
serious offences than the sample limited to s 6 charges. For example, the degree of 
culpability is lower in the case-level sample and so is the identified need for particular 
deterrence. Other than that, the two samples look similar. 
 
5 Methods 
 
  Variation in sentencing can be caused by differences in the case-mix, 
differences in judicial preferences, or both. Figure 1 illustrates the “raw” (i.e., not 
controlling for case-mix differences) inter-court and intra-court district variation of 
the financial liabilities imposed for s 6 offences in the period from March 1994 to 
June 2007. This information was obtained from an OLS model regressing the 
financial liability on District Court binary variables (focusing on District Courts 
which handled at least 20 charges in our s 6 dataset and using Wellington as the 
                                                 
34 In charges/cases where information is incomplete, we code some charge/case characteristics as 
“missing” and include these observations in our regression analysis. While we cannot draw any 
inference from our results on the “missing” categories, this method enables us to at least preserve and 
use all the remaining (i.e., reported) characteristics of those charges/cases.   
35 In both the s 6 and the case-level samples, we include the very rare s 49 (less than 1%) penalties in 
addition to the s 50 penalties. We tested the robustness of our results to the exclusion of s 49 penalties 
and they remained qualitatively unchanged.   
36 In particular, 77% of cases in our case-level dataset involve a single charge, 18% involve two 
charges, 3% three charges, 1% four charges, and 1% more than four charges (up to a maximum of 
seven). Of the single-charge cases, 64% are s 6 (or a subsection thereof) charges. 
  15omitted category), year binary variables (to control for a national time trend in 
sentencing), and CPI (to adjust for the effects of price level changes). Aggregating 
districts with less than 20 charges attenuates small-number variation, preserves the 
degrees of freedom in our OLS model, and makes the graphical exposition easier. 
Three data series are presented – the central series represents the difference between 
the average financial liability imposed in a given district and the average financial 
liability imposed in Wellington. The other two series are constructed by adjusting the 
above estimate by its standard deviation (by subtracting/adding the standard deviation 
from/to the estimate). Hence, the fluctuation of the central series represents variation 
in sentencing across court district and the distance between the lower and the upper 
series represents variation within districts. In this setup, Hastings has the lowest 
liabilities and Nelson the highest liabilities but none of the differences with 
Wellington are statistically significant.
37 
 
  When controlling for case-mix differences by adding the specific factors from 
the  de Spa Guidelines (i.e., all the factors listed above except for 7 and 9) as 
explanatory variables to our model, the ranking of court districts with respect to the 
severity of financial penalties changes (Figure 2). In particular, when case 
characteristics proxied by our de Spa variables are held constant, Manukau has the 
lowest penalties (as compared to Wellington) and Hamilton has the highest. The 
differences between the financial penalties imposed in Nelson, Waitakere, and 
Hamilton and the financial penalties imposed in Wellington are now statistically 
significant at the 90% confidence level suggesting that the three districts may have a 
judicial preference for higher financial liabilities
38 However, this results needs to be 
interpreted with caution because other “facts of the particular cases” need to be taken 
into account. We do so formally in our “full” models described below but here we 
note that differences in the case-mix across court districts do seem to matter for 
explaining district variation in sentencing. Interestingly, while controlling for case 
characteristics increases slightly the difference between the lowest and the highest 
average penalties imposed (from $6,501 to $6,977), within-district variation is 
reduced (with the unweighted average standard deviation decreasing from $3,183 to 
$2,697). In other words, controlling for case characteristics seems to slightly increase 
sentencing variation across court districts (increasing the slope of the middle series in 
Figure 2) but decrease variation within districts (narrowing the “band” around that 
series).
39  
                                                 
37 This may be compared with the unadjusted regional imprisonment rates in SEU (2008) where the 
highest (lowest) rates were in Napier (Wellington). In the SEU study, Christchurch (along with 
Wanganui) had the second highest rate while Auckland (an amalgam of Auckland, North Shore and 
Waitakere DCs) had the second lowest imprisonment rate. SEU argued that these results clearly 
distinguish imprisonment rates in metropolitan areas from the provinces, Christchurch excepted, 
although they also argue (p. 2) that “a case could be made that Christchurch has more of the attributes 
and attitudes of provincial New Zealand and is less like Auckland and Wellington.” Our Figure 1. 
however, suggests that for HSE offences, while Wellington remains a relatively low ‘financial liability’ 
region, it is closely followed by Invercargill and Dunedin while “provincial” Christchurch exhibits very 
similar behaviour to Auckland and Otahuhu as well as provincial Napier. None of the differences are 
statistically significant, however, and we have no good grounds for distinguishing provincial and 
metropolitan regions.     
38 Notably, Napier (whose imprisonment rate still stands out compared to Auckland and also the 
national average when SEU (2007b) adjusts for case mix factors) is not included in our list of possible 
DC outliers. 
39 In comparison, in the SEU (2008) study of selected crimes, case- mix adjustment lowers rather than 
raises district variation in sentencing, while individual judge variations are not examined. 
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  In Figures 3 and 4, we report results of a similar exercise with individual judge 
effects (rather than District Court effects) on the right-hand side. Specifically, these 
two figures illustrate inter-judge and intra-judge variation in financial liabilities 
imposed – both “raw” (Figure 3) and controlling for differences in case characteristics 
proxied by our de Spa variables (Figure 4). For ease of exposition, we only report 
coefficients for judges who handled at least 10 charges in our Section 6 dataset 
(“other judges” represent the omitted category). Out of the 17 judges identified, two 
have significantly higher “raw” financial liabilities (at the 95% confidence level) than 
the rest (Figure 3). However, when case characteristics are controlled for (Figure 4), 
the ranking of individual judges changes and inter-judge variation is substantially 
mitigated, consistent with what might be argued to constitute a lower level of 
“unwarranted” variation. Once again, differences in the case-mix do seem to matter 
for explaining sentencing variation. Notably, the inter- and intra- judge variations are: 
1. greater than the inter- and intra- district variations, respectively, and 2. both 
reduced by controlling for case characteristics.
40 Finally, when we regressed the total 
financial liability on judge dummy variables only, the R-squared of the model was 
very low at 0.02. Moreover, the marginal explanatory power of judge dummies 
decreased when case characteristics were added to the model. In particular, the 
inclusion of judge dummies increased the R-squared just by 0.01 (from 0.61 with case 
characteristics only to 0.62 with case characteristics and judge dummies). 
 
  So what effect do the specific de Spa criteria and other case characteristics 
have on the level of financial liabilities imposed? To study this question, we first 
estimate a “baseline” OLS model of the following form: 
 
Liabilityi = α + βXi + ΣθtTimei + γCPIi + εi 
 
where  i  indexes charges,  Liability  stands for the sum of fines imposed and 
reparations awarded,  X  is a vector of the specific factors from the de Spa Guidelines,  
Time  are year binary variables,  CPI  is the Consumer Price Index, and  ε  is a 
normally distributed error term. We calculate robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroskedasticity. In a second model, called the “full” model, we add several other 
“facts of the particular cases” (voluntary payment, restorative justice conference, 
employee breach of duty, and employer size) and District Court binary variables to 
the right-hand side. We also allow for interactive effects of our explanatory variables. 
We do not include sentence starting points in our “full” model for two reasons: First, 
starting points themselves can be a function of some of our other explanatory 
variables and as such represent an intermediate outcome rather than a pure input 
variable. Also, we cannot effectively include starting points due to data limitations – 
only 4% of our s 6 charges have the existence (and not necessarily the level) of a 
starting point recorded. Finally, we estimate a model of the effects of the factors 
identified as key in the U.S. Guidelines and regress the total financial liabilities on the 
degree of harm, employer’s safety record, year binary variables, and CPI only. 
 
  As a robustness check, we repeat all of the above estimations with judge 
individual effects (instead of District Court effects) on the right-hand side and the 
results are qualitatively unchanged. We also test the sensitivity of our results to using 
                                                 
40 Result 2 is also found in the SEU (2007a, 2007b) studies on imprisonment rates. 
  17the natural logarithm of the financial liability as the dependent variable. This 
specification allows the explanatory variables to have a percentage (rather than a 
level) effect on the financial liability imposed. Again, our main results remain 
unchanged. In addition to estimating all of the above models on the coherent s 6 
sample (Table 2), we also check how our models perform in multiple-charge and/or 
multiple-victim cases (Table 3). Finally, we allow the effects of case characteristics to 
differ before the implementation of the Sentencing Act 2002 (i.e., prior to 30 June 
2002) and after the introduction of the HSE Act amendments (i.e., after 1 May 2003) 
by estimating separate models for the two time periods (Table 4).
41 We have too few 
observations between July 2002 and April 2003 to be able to draw reliable inferences 
about the interim period.
42    
 
6 Results 
 
  Column 1 of Table 2 reports our “baseline” results for s 6 offences. Many of 
the  de Spa criteria have the expected effect on financial penalties and are highly 
statistically significant. The financial liability increases significantly with the degrees 
of culpability and harm,
43 and with the need for particular deterrence. For example, 
the financial liabilities are on average $18,908 higher for fatal accidents than for 
accidents where harm is classified as ‘high’ and a ‘high’ degree of culpability 
(compared to ‘medium’ culpability) increases financial liabilities by $11,462. The 
most significant mitigating factor seems to be the defendant’s financial limitations, 
reducing financial liabilities by $7,006, on average. While several of the de Spa 
criteria (e.g., remedial action and the need for general deterrence) do not reach 
statistical significance, it is important to include them in the “baseline” model for a 
couple of reasons. First, the finding that several factors do not seem to have a 
systematic effect on sentencing is interesting in itself. Second, to the extent that these 
variables are correlated with other case/defendant characteristics, it is important to 
control for them in order to get unbiased estimates of the characteristics they are 
correlated with. 
 
  Two puzzling results emerge in the baseline model: First, ‘great’ safety record 
is associated with higher financial liabilities, ceteris paribus. However, this result is 
not very robust across our model specifications and so we do not have much 
confidence in it. Second, a puzzling result occurs with respect to the financial 
implications of remorse. In particular, our “baseline” Section 6 model indicates that 
the presence of remorse increases financial liabilities by $7,757, on average! We have 
several hypotheses about such an effect and we plan to investigate them rigorously in 
our future work. For example, remorse could be seen as a signal of guilt in the 
absence of a guilty plea, or judges do discount fines for remorse but raise reparation 
awards by even larger amounts when remorse is expressed. Alternatively, it is 
possible that our measures of the “seriousness” of an offence derived from case 
                                                 
41 Although the importance of these structural shifts seems obvious, their impact may have been limited 
by the courts’ interpretation of the totality principle, whereby fines were used residually to make up 
any shortfall between reparations (which enjoy primacy in sentencing) and financial liabilities as we 
define them. For a critical account of this process, see Mason (2008). 
42 This is also true for the pre-de Spa period. 
43 It might be noted that the two most important factors identified by the Sentencing Establishment Unit 
of the Law Commission when framing proposed formal criminal sentencing guidelines are statistically 
significant in our study of HSE offences. 
  18judgements and sentencing notes are too broad and the presence of remorse indicates 
that the defendant is likely to be at a high end of our culpability and/or harm range. To 
shed some light on this latter mechanism, we study interactive effects of remorse and 
the degrees of culpability and harm (as well as differential effects of remorse by 
District Court) in our “full” model (column 2 of Table 2). 
 
  In the “full” model, the effect of remorse per se becomes insignificant but 
remorse significantly increases financial liabilities in cases with fatal harm.
44 The 
liability for remorse seems to be by far the largest (and the most statistically 
significant) in Waitakere. With respect to the other de Spa factors, a high degree of 
harm has an independent positive effect on financial liabilities and so does the need 
for particular deterrence. Interestingly, being a small employer brings an additional 
sizeable ($15,658) and statistically significant reduction of liabilities. Being a medium 
size employer reduces liabilities by $9,718. A puzzling result in the full model is that 
employer attendance at a restorative justice conference greatly increases financial 
penalties (by $60,997). As shown below, this effect is much reduced in our case-level 
analysis but it remains positive, statistically significant, and relatively large (at 
$26,308). Our hypotheses here resemble those for remorse but our scope for exploring 
them further is limited by the small number of restorative justice conferences in our 
data. In particular, only 6 charges in our s 6 dataset and 15 cases in our case-level 
dataset involved a restorative justice conference.
45 
 
  Column 3 of Table 2 reports the effects of the factors considered in the U.S. 
Guidelines. Here, the financial liability imposed increases substantially with the 
degree of harm and weakly also with a record of previous convictions (whose 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 90% but not the 95% confidence level). 
Interestingly, the R-squared of this simple model is relatively high, 0.37 as compared 
to 0.64 in the “full” model, meaning that the simple model is still capable of 
explaining a relatively large fraction (37%) of the variation in financial liabilities. 
 
  As noted earlier, in the District Court de Spa case a fine of $6,500 was 
imposed on the employer and this was later increased to $15,000 by the High Court 
which noted that an initial fine of as much as $20,000 would have been unlikely to be 
overturned on appeal. What financial liability would our s 6 models “retrospectively 
predict” for the de Spa case? Applying the estimated parameters from our “baseline” 
model to the factors in the de Spa case as evaluated by the District Court and the High 
Court, we “predict” total financial liabilities of $22,370 and $21,878, respectively. 
These are very close to the value deemed appropriate by the High Court! The “full” 
model reduces these estimates slightly to $20,564 for the District Court and $17,918 
for the High Court while the model based on the U.S. Guidelines predicts $20,888 for 
both. 
 
  Our case-level models (Table 3) contain the same explanatory variables as the 
Section 6 models with the addition of one factor – the number of charges involved. As 
                                                 
44 In an OLS model, the overall effect of remorse on the total financial liability imposed can be 
calculated by summing the applicable remorse-related coefficients. For example, in a case with high 
culpability and fatal harm, the overall effect of remorse is obtained by adding up the coefficients on 
‘remorse’, ‘remorse*high culpability’, and ‘remorse*fatal harm’. 
45 To our knowledge, restorative justice conferences were unavailable in the early years of our study 
period and that may be the reason why they were not explicitly mentioned in the de Spa Guidelines. 
  19expected, this variable is positive (at $2,500-3,500) and highly statistically significant 
across all of our model specifications. The effects of the de Spa case characteristics in 
the “baseline” model (column 1) are qualitatively very similar to those observed in the 
s 6 analysis above and are of the same order of magnitude. An interesting exception is 
the effect of remorse which becomes much smaller ($3,137) and insignificant. In the 
“full” model (column 2), however, remorse still substantially and statistically 
significantly increases financial penalties in cases with fatal harm. The liability for 
remorse also remains high in Waitakere. All other significant effects in the “full” 
model mimic those from our s 6 analysis with the only exception (mentioned above) 
of a substantially smaller liability for a restorative justice conference. Finally, the 
model limited to the U.S. variables on the right-hand side (column 3) also supports 
results from the s 6 analysis above. In addition, ‘poor’ safety record and a safety 
record with previous convictions significantly increase case-level liabilities. 
 
  Even though most of the statistically significant coefficients in the case-level 
analysis closely resemble those from the Section 6 models, the “retrospectively 
predicted” financial liabilities for de Spa are somewhat higher. This is an intuitively 
appealing result since the de Spa case involved 3 charges (Sections 6, 7, and 10) and 
so the overall liability should be larger than a liability for the s 6 component.
46 More 
specifically, applying the estimated parameters from our “baseline” model to the de 
Spa case as evaluated by the District Court and the High Court, we now “predict” 
total financial liabilities of $30,128 and $29,719, respectively. The “full” model 
reduces these estimates to $23,748 for the District Court and $22,100 for the High 
Court while the model based on the U.S. Guidelines predicts $31,528. 
 
  The first two columns of Table 4 present results of our “baseline” Section 6 
analysis stratified into two time periods: before the implementation of the Sentencing 
Act 2002 (i.e., prior to 30 June 2002) and after the introduction of the HSE Act 
amendments (i.e., after 1 May 2003).
47 The most obvious pattern here is that larger 
financial amounts are at stake in the more recent period. So, while high culpability, 
high harm, and the need for particular deterrence significantly increase the financial 
liability in both periods, the effects are quantitatively much larger in the recent period. 
For example, the liabilities for ‘high’ culpability were $5,748 prior to June 2002 and 
$15,886 after May 2003. Similarly, a discount was awarded on the basis of the 
defendant’s financial limitations in both periods but it was much larger in the later 
period ($16,106 compared to $2,769). Interestingly, the puzzling liabilities for 
remorse and a ‘great’ safety record significant in the full sample are only observed in 
the later period. Also, while the earlier period (like the entire period) exhibits no clear 
time trend, there is a significant increase in the financial liabilities imposed post-2003. 
On the other hand, the earlier period (and not the later period) exhibits statistically 
significant liabilities for a safety record with previous convictions. The results from 
the case-level analysis stratified by time period (the last two columns of Table 4) are 
qualitatively similar but the presence of remorse and the employer’s safety record do 
not reach statistical significance in either period. Interestingly, the number of charges 
was a significant predictor of the financial liability imposed only in the earlier period.  
                                                 
46 Unlike in many subsequent District Court cases, the sentence in the High Court de Spa case was not 
attached to any specific charge or charges. 
47 It is important to note that the later period contains much richer data as it largely corresponds with 
the period for which the Department of Labour provides electronic records of decisions, sentencing 
notes, summaries of facts, and returns on prosecutions. 
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7  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
This study focuses on explaining the determinants of sentencing variation for 
health and safety in employment offences in New Zealand mainly in terms of the 
criteria listed in the guideline judgment of the de Spa appeal case and subsequently 
codified in the Sentencing Act. Unlike many other studies (particularly those 
examining the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines for criminal offences), however, 
we do not put too much emphasis on explaining sentencing variation per se since an 
effective comparison of pre- and post-de Spa Guideline sentences is thwarted by the 
paucity of pre-de Spa observations. Instead, our primary focus is on what we can 
explain. For example, we show how financial liability for employers increases with 
the degrees of culpability and harm, and with the need for particular deterrence. 
Interestingly, a model limited to some of these basic criteria (the degree of harm and 
the employer’s safety record) similar to those used in the U.S. Guidelines has a 
relatively high explanatory power. The most significant mitigating factors seem to be 
the defendant’s financial limitations and small employer size. Other variables, such as 
a ‘guilty’ plea, cooperation, or the need for general deterrence do not seem to play a 
significant role. We resist any temptation to identify residual variation in sentencing 
with variation in judicial preferences. The residual variation has three sources. First, a 
mix of factors for which we cannot account more precisely (e.g., our widespread use 
of binary rather than continuous variables). Second, omitted explanatory variables; 
notwithstanding our attempt to be comprehensive in respect of those variables 
frequently mentioned by the judiciary, idiosyncratic circumstances of cases are not 
included. Third, variation in judicial preferences. All three sources are likely to play a 
role. Further, some period-specific unexplained sentencing variability is likely to be 
affected by major legislative shifts such as major changes in the cap on fines and the 
introduction of uncapped, insurable reparations that have primacy in the sentencing 
process but no specific sentencing guidelines to date.     
 
Given that the de Spa Guidelines  (including their codification) provide no 
guidance with respect to recommended magnitudes of the effects of their specific 
sentencing criteria, we demonstrate the average effects of these criteria, including a 
number of factors not observable until trial. For policy purposes, the question is 
whether society as a whole approves of financial liabilities for employers of the 
magnitudes we report. If not, perhaps tighter guidelines including constraints on 
adjustments made once additional information (e.g., on aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances) becomes available at trial. Even if total financial liabilities are deemed 
appropriate, there may be some concern by society at the contribution of some 
variables to sentences; e.g., the apparent “double discounts” for small employer size 
and employer judgment-proofness. If, however, the outcomes are deemed satisfactory, 
the model could be used, in practice as well as principle, to determine a sentencing 
endpoint (rather than the more conventional starting point). Judges would then know 
that they were sentencing in a representative manner. We would recommend the use 
of the model estimated for the post-HSE amendment period since a number of 
coefficients are substantially larger after May 2003 than previously (e.g., the liability 
for ‘high’ harm has almost tripled and the discount for defendant’s financial 
limitations has increased more than five times). Implementation would require 
continuous updating of data used in the regressions to take account of issues such as 
  21inflation, appeal judgments relevant to sentencing, further HSE or Sentencing Act 
amendments, trends in sentencing, and the like. 
 
A related issue is that our models generally retrospectively predict the High 
Court’s position in de Spa well. By and large, judges have followed the de Spa 
Guidelines. Consequently, sentences prescribed by our model would seem unlikely to 
be successfully appealed unless extraordinary circumstances prevailed.  
 
There are limitations on what judges report in their decisions and sentencing 
notes, and on what is reported in the Department of Labour’s returns on prosecution. 
As noted earlier, much information on explanatory variables, especially in the earlier 
years, is missing. Broad categories used by judges may affect the interpretation of 
some of the other explanatory variables employed; e.g., the presence of remorse may 
be correlated with accident seriousness and employer culpability not picked up in the 
broad measures widely used and so the presence of remorse may be associated with 
higher (rather than lower) financial liabilities imposed. Importantly, however, we 
have much the same information as does the judiciary as a whole regarding the basis 
of other judges’ decisions. 
 
Further research on HSE sentencing currently being undertaken involves 
collecting detailed data on evidence of remorse in individual cases. Also, High Court 
sentencing decisions are being investigated to check the “appeal-proofness” of 
existing decisions by re-estimating the models with sentence appeal decisions 
substituted for their District Court counterparts. Sentencing in cases involving 
incidents (separate from, or in addition to accidents) is under examination, as is 
sentencing of employees when they (separately, or jointly with employers) breach the 
care standard. We are also examining the composition of employers’ financial 
liability, since much greater variability can be expected in the ratio of fines to total 
financial liability than in total liability itself as composition has clearly exhibited 
marked structural shifts following the implementation of the Sentencing Act, HSE Act 
amendments, and subsequent changes in court interpretations of the Sentencing Act 
with respect to the substitutability of reparations (especially those that are insured) for 
fines. 
  22 
Figure 1. 
District Court Effects on Financial Liabilities
Relative to Wellington; Not Controlling for Case Characteristics
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Figure 2. 
District Court Effects on Financial Liabilities
Relative to Wellington; Holding DeSpa Case Characteristics Constant
-$8,000
-$6,000
-$4,000
-$2,000
$0
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000
$8,000
$10,000
02468 1 0 1 2 1 4
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
Coefficient (compared to Wellington) Coefficient - SD Coefficient + SD
O
t
a
h
u
h
u
T
a
u
r
a
n
g
a
N
e
l
s
o
n
M
a
n
u
k
a
u
W
a
i
t
a
k
e
r
e
I
n
v
e
r
c
a
r
g
i
l
l
H
a
m
i
l
t
o
n
O
t
h
e
r
 
D
C
s
C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h
A
u
c
k
l
a
n
d
D
u
n
e
d
i
n
N
a
p
i
e
r
H
a
s
t
i
n
g
s
 
  23Figure 3. 
 
Individual Judge Effects on Financial Liabilities
Relative to Other Judges; Not Controlling for Case Characteristics
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Figure 4. 
 
Individual Judge Effects on Financial Liabilities
Relative to Other Judges; Holding DeSpa Case Characteristics Constant
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  24Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Section 6 Charges and Cases 
 
Variable Section  6 
sample 
(775 obs.) 
Case-level 
sample 
(1,100 obs.) 
Financial liability (mean in $)  10,835 11,765 
Low  0.65  1.18 
Low-medium  3.87  4.64 
Medium  10.97  9.82 
Medium-high  5.16  4.45 
High  5.16  4.91 
Degree of 
culpability 
(%) 
Unknown  74.19  75.00 
Low/medium  6.71  7.27 
High  82.45  81.27 
Fatal  10.19  10.91 
Degree of harm 
(%) 
Unknown  0.77  0.55 
Defendant’s financial limitations (%)  3.61  5.73 
Remorse (%)  26.45  24.55 
Cooperation (%)  26.84  24.91 
Remedial action (%)  29.94  26.18 
Guilty plea (%)  48.90  45.00 
Need for particular deterrence (%)  7.23  5.91 
Need for general deterrence (%)  30.06  27.18 
Poor  1.03  0.64 
Previous convictions  7.48  6.18 
No previous convictions  11.87  10.91 
Good  9.68  9.18 
Great  2.58  2.73 
Safety record 
(%) 
Unknown  67.35  70.36 
Voluntary payment made (%)  6.06  4.91 
Restorative justice conference (%)  0.77  1.36 
Employee breach of duty (%)  8.26  8.09 
Small 2.71  3.91 
Medium 0.39  0.36 
Large 10.97  8.28 
Size of employer 
(%) 
Unknown 85.94  87.45 
Consumer Price Index (mean)  875  872 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) accident 
rate (mean of accidents/1,000 employees) 
30.90 31.70 
Number of charges per case (mean)  -  1.32 
 
Specific case characteristics listed in the de Spa Guidelines are shaded. 
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Table 2. Determinants of the Financial Liability; s 6 Charges 
 
Explanatory variable  ‘Baseline’ 
model 
(765 obs.) 
‘Full’ 
model 
(747 obs.) 
U.S. 
guidelines
(765 obs.) 
 
Case characteristics 
 
Low  -1,002 
(3,007) 
-3,964* 
(2,154) 
- 
Low-medium  -5,274** 
(2,320) 
-5,375* 
(2,994) 
- 
Medium-high  14,059*** 
(4,361) 
5,192 
(3,436) 
- 
High  11,462** 
(4,754) 
3,014 
(2,539) 
- 
Degree of 
culpability 
(compared to 
medium) 
Unknown  707 
(1,787) 
-2,226 
(1,751) 
- 
Low/medium  -2,959** 
(1,297) 
-4,535*** 
(1,132) 
-5,353*** 
(1,160) 
Fatal  18,908*** 
(3,249) 
8,458*** 
(1,772) 
19,910*** 
(3,371) 
Degree of harm 
(compared to 
high)  
Unknown  6,383 
(4,354) 
6,219 
(4,061) 
6,030 
(4,283) 
Defendant’s financial limitations  -7,006** 
(3,016) 
-5,077* 
(2,827) 
- 
Remorse  7,757** 
(3,310) 
-3,177 
(3,883) 
- 
Cooperation  -7,104 
(5,252) 
-5,678 
(3,478) 
- 
Remedial action  1,130 
(2,819) 
382 
(2,155) 
- 
Guilty plea  -3,789 
(3,087) 
-2,115 
(2,084) 
- 
Need for particular deterrence  9,025** 
(4,178) 
8,055** 
(3,347) 
- 
Need for general deterrence  215 
(1,589) 
-442 
(1,648) 
- 
Poor  -5,765 
(4,663) 
-4,579 
(4,454) 
3,800 
(3,330) 
Previous convictions  2,325 
(3,300) 
1,177 
(2,935) 
5,702* 
(3,018) 
Good  -66 
(3,025) 
-2,323 
(2,559) 
1,071 
(3,419) 
Great  5,368** 
(2,612) 
5,140* 
(2,732) 
3,223 
(2,835) 
Safety record 
(compared to no 
previous 
convictions) 
Unknown  207 
(3,009) 
-742 
(2,690) 
234 
(2,412) 
Voluntary payment made  - 1,841 
(3,563) 
- 
Restorative justice conference  - 60,997** 
(25,877) 
- 
Employee breach of duty  - -1,468 
(1,580) 
- 
Small  - -15,658*** 
(5,523) 
- 
Medium  - -9,718** 
(4,892) 
- 
Size of employer 
(compared to 
large) 
Unknown  - -6,312***  - 
  26(2,268) 
Low  - 3,349 
(8,777) 
- 
Low-medium  - 3,047 
(4,504) 
- 
Medium-high  - 13,040* 
(7,616) 
- 
High  - 6,540 
(5,860) 
- 
Degree of 
culpability 
(compared to 
medium) × 
remorse 
Unknown  - 4,429 
(3,363) 
- 
Low/medium  - 2,054 
(3,774) 
-  Degree of harm 
(compared to 
high) × remorse  Fatal  - 18,733*** 
(5,051) 
- 
 
Temporal effects 
 
Intercept  -28,140 
(58,494) 
-30,301 
(56,633) 
-64,506 
(60,647) 
1995  -745 
(2,681) 
-392 
(2,090) 
105 
(2,375) 
1996  2,077 
(3,570) 
1,823 
(2,982) 
1,827 
(3,411) 
1997  333 
(4,197) 
-1,045 
(3,710) 
106 
(4,082) 
1998  -1,004 
(4,935) 
-492 
(4,384) 
-2,667 
(4,893) 
1999  1,933 
(4,694) 
1,014 
(4,332) 
-15 
(4,693) 
2000  960 
(6,193) 
415 
(5,810) 
-1,870 
(6,289) 
2001  201 
(7,716) 
-1,350 
(7,444) 
-5,134 
(8,195) 
2002  89 
(9,268) 
-1,415 
(9,132) 
-7,380 
(9,826) 
2003  -2,200 
(10,406) 
-3,730 
(9,910) 
-7,763 
(11,087) 
2004  5,908 
(12,155) 
3,907 
(11,517) 
-1,163 
(13,008) 
2005  14,647 
(14,837) 
8,095 
(13,119) 
6,151 
(15,721) 
2006  10,387 
(17,404) 
4,417 
(16,471) 
189 
(19,003) 
Year (compared 
to 1994) 
 
2007  18,877 
(19,523) 
10,663 
(19,081) 
9,866 
(20,201) 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)  38 
(76) 
52 
(72) 
85 
(79) 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) 
accident rate (accidents/1,000 employees) 
- 22 
(26) 
- 
 
District Court effects 
 
Auckland  - 482 
(1,552) 
- 
Christchurch  - 1,425 
(1,466) 
- 
Dunedin  - 684 
(1,988) 
- 
District Court 
(compared to 
Wellington) 
Hamilton  - 3,761* 
(1,983) 
- 
  27Hastings  - 579 
(1,638) 
- 
Invercargill  - 807 
(1,670) 
- 
Manukau  - 251 
(2,316) 
- 
Napier  - 3,135** 
(1,585) 
- 
Nelson  - 243 
(1,775) 
- 
Otahuhu  - 926 
(1,519) 
- 
Tauranga  - 2,307 
(3,234) 
- 
Waitakere  - 884 
(1,467) 
- 
Other  - 1,352 
(1,453) 
- 
Auckland  - 2,146 
(4,161) 
- 
Christchurch  - -1,674 
(4,836) 
- 
Dunedin  - 5,659 
(4,583) 
- 
Hamilton  - -18,722 
(18,906) 
- 
Hastings  - 1,115 
(4,968) 
- 
Invercargill  - -3,193 
(5,314) 
- 
Manukau  - 1,212 
(5,166) 
- 
Napier  - -392 
(5,069) 
- 
Nelson  - 9,213 
(9,890) 
- 
Otahuhu  - 1,056 
(5,087) 
- 
Tauranga  - 1,576 
(9,096) 
- 
Waitakere  - 43,855** 
(18,426) 
- 
District Court 
(compared to 
Wellington) × 
remorse 
Other  - 1,941 
(4,020) 
- 
R-squared  0.48 0.64  0.37 
 
Specific case characteristics listed in the de Spa Guidelines are shaded. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively. Standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. 
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Explanatory variable  ‘Baseline’ 
model 
(1,099 obs.) 
‘Full’ 
model 
(1,075 obs.) 
U.S. 
guidelines
(1,099 obs.) 
 
Case characteristics 
 
Low  -8,736*** 
(3,286) 
-10,593*** 
(3,989) 
- 
Low-medium  -744 
(2,440) 
-3,481 
(2,239) 
- 
Medium-high  15,716*** 
(4,684) 
4,575 
(3,143) 
- 
High  11,325*** 
(4,274) 
3,458 
(2,781) 
- 
Degree of 
culpability 
(compared to 
medium) 
Unknown  1,958 
(1,546) 
-1,538 
(1,477) 
- 
Low/medium  -3,294*** 
(1,083) 
-4,439*** 
(1,085) 
-4,736*** 
(881) 
Fatal  19,008*** 
(2,535) 
10,882*** 
(1,484) 
19,886*** 
(2,785) 
Degree of harm 
(compared to 
high)  
Unknown  5,373 
(3,935) 
4,705 
(3,881) 
5,283 
(3,882) 
Defendant’s financial limitations  -7,038*** 
(2,460) 
-5,618** 
(2,276) 
- 
Remorse  3,137 
(2,622) 
-4,768 
(4,291) 
- 
Cooperation  -4,390 
(4,127) 
-4,813 
(3,355) 
- 
Remedial action  2,824 
(2,423) 
2,633 
(2,149) 
- 
Guilty plea  -2,136 
(2,170) 
-1,298 
(2,007) 
- 
Need for particular deterrence  7,086* 
(4,131) 
7,001* 
(3,561) 
- 
Need for general deterrence  1,542 
(1,356) 
639 
(1,420) 
- 
Poor  -2,675 
(5,286) 
-986 
(6,237) 
7,104** 
(3,315) 
Previous convictions  2,883 
(3,316) 
298 
(3,191) 
6,417** 
(3,093) 
Good  334 
(3,020) 
-2,581 
(2,919) 
1,439 
(3,379) 
Great  -1,607 
(2,699) 
-3,737 
(2,803) 
-1,104 
(2,619) 
Safety record 
(compared to no 
previous 
convictions) 
Unknown  -60 
(2,591) 
-608 
(2,414) 
-744 
(2,244) 
Voluntary payment made  - 2,815 
(3,833) 
- 
Restorative justice conference  - 26,308** 
(11,745) 
- 
Employee breach of duty  - -947 
(1,499) 
- 
Small  - -17,077*** 
(4,085) 
- 
Medium  - -107 
(12,280) 
- 
Size of employer 
(compared to 
large) 
Unknown  - -9,570*** 
(2,736) 
- 
  29Low  - 6,731 
(7,521) 
- 
Low-medium  - 5,014 
(3,755) 
- 
Medium-high  - 13,057* 
(7,749) 
- 
High  - 5,623 
(6,143) 
- 
Degree of 
culpability 
(compared to 
medium) × 
remorse 
Unknown  - 3,826 
(2,717) 
- 
Low/medium  - -619 
(4,055) 
-  Degree of harm 
(compared to 
high) × remorse  Fatal  - 12,864*** 
(4,451) 
- 
Number of charges  2,768*** 
(818) 
2,484*** 
(879) 
3,524*** 
(759) 
 
Temporal effects 
 
Intercept  -7,089 
(50,689) 
-11,267 
(47,680) 
-24,927 
(52,034) 
1995  -534 
(1,699) 
-150 
(1,638) 
-62 
(1,669) 
1996  2,469 
(2,725) 
1,871 
(2,511) 
2,583 
(2,742) 
1997  559 
(3,284) 
-781 
(3,106) 
535 
(3,324) 
1998  -818 
(3,897) 
-775 
(3,686) 
-1,468 
(3,981) 
1999  1,257 
(3,789) 
-205 
(3,625) 
601 
(3,856) 
2000  2,009 
(5,144) 
619 
(4,970) 
571 
(5,268) 
2001  1,903 
(6,585) 
-655 
(6,095) 
-531 
(6,896) 
2002  2,266 
(8,048) 
266 
(7,465) 
-2,221 
(8,348) 
2003  1,520 
(8,875) 
-515 
(8,341) 
-1,711 
(9,326) 
2004  10,355 
(10,435) 
2,430 
(9,748) 
7,143 
(10,902) 
2005  16,861 
(12,519) 
11,784 
(11,500) 
12,292 
(13,334) 
2006  11,350 
(15,141) 
5,283 
(13,941) 
6,308 
(15,923) 
Year (compared 
to 1994) 
 
2007  22,213 
(17,124) 
16,489 
(15,905) 
16,962 
(16,614) 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)  8 
(65) 
31 
(61) 
32 
(67) 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) 
accident rate (accidents/1,000 employees) 
- -9 
(24) 
- 
 
District Court effects 
 
Auckland  - 316 
(1,683) 
- 
Christchurch  - 573 
(1,581) 
- 
Dunedin  - -696 
(1,774) 
- 
District Court 
(compared to 
Wellington) 
Hamilton  - 2,074  - 
  30(1,798) 
Hastings  - 84 
(2,015) 
- 
Invercargill  - 565 
(1,877) 
- 
Manukau  - -694 
(2,464) 
- 
Napier  - 1,124 
(1,723) 
- 
Nelson  - 407 
(2,616) 
- 
Otahuhu  - -17 
(1,649) 
- 
Tauranga  - -1,091 
(2,591) 
- 
Waitakere  - -890 
(1,730) 
- 
Other  - 108 
(1,564) 
- 
Auckland  - -1,112 
(4,735) 
- 
Christchurch  - -2,632 
(4,786) 
- 
Dunedin  - -109 
(5,053) 
- 
Hamilton  - -8,669 
(6,892) 
- 
Hastings  - -5,453 
(6,531) 
- 
Invercargill  - -3,746 
(6,459) 
- 
Manukau  - -2,695 
(5,058) 
- 
Napier  - 2,173 
(4,685) 
- 
Nelson  - 14,321 
(16,153) 
- 
Otahuhu  - 15,544 
(12,392) 
- 
Tauranga  - -10,235 
(7,627) 
- 
Waitakere  - 23,887** 
(11,622) 
- 
District Court 
(compared to 
Wellington) × 
remorse 
Other  - 4,296 
(4,155) 
- 
R-squared  0.44 0.54  0.36 
 
Specific case characteristics listed in the de Spa Guidelines are shaded. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively. Standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. 
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Explanatory variable  s6 Charges; 
1 Mar 1994 - 
30 Jun 2002 
(573 obs.) 
s6 Charges; 
1 May 2003 – 
30 Jun 2007 
(160 obs.)  
Case-Level; 
1 Mar 1994 - 
30 Jun 2002 
(824 obs.) 
Case-Level; 
1 May 2003 – 
30 Jun 2007 
(221 obs.) 
 
Case characteristics 
 
Low  -2,766* 
(1,416) 
6,617 
(5,546) 
-1,828 
(2,425) 
-15,947** 
(7,570) 
Low-medium  -1,505 
(1,132) 
-9,354** 
(4,361) 
-3,125* 
(1,760) 
-4,750 
(4,025) 
Medium-high  3,196 
(1,945) 
16,365** 
(6,344) 
4,027* 
(2,053) 
23,519*** 
(7,051) 
High  5,748*** 
(1,805) 
15,886 
(12,386) 
8,103*** 
(2,161) 
8,851 
(9,970) 
Degree of culpability 
(compared to 
medium) 
Unknown  426 
(983) 
-1,748 
(3,132) 
324 
(1,045) 
267 
(2,821) 
Low/medium  -2,731*** 
(544) 
-6,692* 
(3,896) 
-3,285*** 
(671) 
-2,529 
(3,262) 
Fatal  7,647*** 
(1,244) 
54,461*** 
(8,310) 
9,351*** 
(1,096) 
50,789*** 
(7,300) 
Degree of harm 
(compared to high)  
Unknown  7,137 
(5,221) 
-  5,930 
(4,544) 
- 
Defendant’s financial limitations  -2,769** 
(1,343) 
-16,106** 
(7,212) 
-2,765 
(1,791) 
-13,235*** 
(4,575) 
Remorse  -912 
(1,317) 
12,279** 
(5,663) 
-236 
(1,305) 
6,054 
(4,806) 
Cooperation  858 
(1,438) 
-12,413 
(8,375) 
-463 
(1,555) 
-9,940 
(6,913) 
Remedial action  2,354* 
(1,229) 
4,261 
(7,571) 
2,757** 
(1,199) 
4,468 
(5,447) 
Guilty plea  946 
(829) 
-19,416 
(12,635) 
1,119 
(975) 
-9,341 
(9,318) 
Need for particular deterrence  3,792** 
(1,534) 
11,877** 
(4,849) 
7,186** 
(3,208) 
9,477** 
(4,765) 
Need for general deterrence  -32 
(1,089) 
-1,509 
(3,803) 
345 
(1,133) 
-2,118 
(2,970) 
Poor  -2,529 
(2,845) 
-  1,616 
(4,913) 
- 
Previous convictions  4,927*** 
(1,715) 
3,079 
(3,686) 
3,296 
(2,000) 
2,890 
(4,782) 
Good  1,878 
(1,377) 
-2,457 
(5,029) 
1,821 
(1,795) 
-2,101 
(4,674) 
Great  3,788* 
(1,987) 
15,301*** 
(5,153) 
3,126 
(2,127) 
-540 
(4,433) 
Safety record 
(compared to no 
previous convictions) 
Unknown  3,111** 
(1,258) 
-2,966 
(5,000) 
2,192 
(1,603) 
-5,153 
(4,339) 
Number of charges  - -  3,646*** 
(571) 
-988 
(2,907) 
 
Temporal effects 
 
Intercept  -27,668 
(27,288) 
65,607 
(178,180) 
-35,797 
(29,586) 
86,092 
(154,466) 
1995  890 
(1,220) 
- -266 
(1,168) 
- 
1996  3,539** 
(1,673) 
- 2,311 
(1,827) 
- 
Year (compared to 
1994 or 2003) 
 
1997  1,508 -  142  - 
  32(1,960) (2,031) 
1998  1,092 
(2,262) 
- -1,331 
(2,384) 
- 
1999  2,719 
(2,263) 
- 223 
(2,365) 
- 
2000  1,951 
(2,891) 
- 92 
(3,182) 
- 
2001  -688 
(3,585) 
- -1,719 
(3,826) 
- 
2002  -768 
(4,321) 
- -3,231 
(4,689) 
- 
2003  -754 
(4,647) 
- -2,785 
(5,158) 
- 
2004  3,493 
(5,858) 
32,600*** 
(7,778) 
-1,877 
(8,388) 
16,897** 
(6,510) 
2005  - 40,342*** 
(11,013) 
- 21,865** 
(8,691) 
2006  - 40,292*** 
(14,630) 
- 18,639 
(13,006) 
2007  - 45,382** 
(18,592) 
- 30,177* 
(18,010) 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)  34 
(35) 
-73 
(178) 
42 
(38) 
-81 
(152) 
R-squared  0.37 0.65 0.44 0.53 
 
Specific case characteristics listed in the de Spa Guidelines are shaded. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively. Standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. 
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